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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHERMAN CARTER, A Taxpayer, 
for himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
BEAVER COUNTY SERVICE AREA 
NUMBER ONE, a body corporate and 
politic, JAMES G. WILLIAMS, 
PAULK. NIELSON, EVAN C. 
NIELSEN, ALLEN C. REYNOLDS, 
and ARLO MESSINGER, as 
Trustees of said Service Area, 
Defendants 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
The Beaver County Service Area Number One was 
created in 1959 under authority of Title 17, Chapter 29, 
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, for the 
purpose of building a hospital. There are about 3700 people 
in Beaver County and approximately 2,000 live in Service 
Area Number One. Service Area Number One consists of 
the Eastern one-half of Beaver County and includes only 
one third class city, which is Beaver City, and several un-
incorporated and rural communities. Service Area Num-
ber Two is the Western one-half of Beaver County and the 
two service areas combined cover all of Beaver County. 
Service Area Number One has assessed and collected taxes 
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2 
for three years, has acquired property for a building site 
for a hospital and has expended funds for architect's fees., 
attorney's fees, and other purposes. The validity of the 
act which allowed the creation of such a service area is 
questioned. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SAID ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 29 
OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION IN THAT IT 
DELEGATES TO A SPECIAL COMMISSION, A PRI-
VATE CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION POWER TO 
MAKE, SUPERVISE OR INTERFERE WITH MUNICI-
PAL IMPROVEMENTS, MONEY, PROPERTY AND TO 
LEVY TAXES AND TO PERFORM MUNICIPAL FUNC-
TIONS. 
Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution pro-
vides as follows: 
"The legislature shall not delegate to any spe-
cial commission, private corporation or association, 
any power to make, supervise or interfere with any 
municipal improvement, monley, property or ef-
fects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy 
taxes, to select a capitol site, or to perform any mu-
nicipal functions. 
The most recent case to discuss this question is Back-
man vs. Salt Lake County, 375 P2d. 765, 13 Utah 2d. 412. 
There the Civic Auditorium Act, which was patterned 
upon the water district act was held to be unconstitutional 
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in that it was a delegation to a special commission. The 
Court held that three provisions or conditions are neces-
sary to violate this section of the Constitution. They are: 
1. Delegation to a private commission of power to 
2. Interfere with municipal property, or 
3. To perform a municipal function. 
The commission created under 17-29, UCA, 1953, as 
amended, is no different than the commission created un-
der the Civic Auditorium Act. Under the Civic Auditorium 
Act there are more members, the County Commissioners 
select only part of the Commission, but there is no differ-
ence in substance. If the County Service Area Act had been 
amended to provide for the building of a civic auditorium 
and sports arena could one hold that the result of the 
Backman case would have been differenrt? Sound reason-
ing says No. 
Sections 10-8-90 and 17-5-45, UCA, 1953, give to cities 
and towns of the third class and to counties respectively 
the right to construct, own and operate hospitals jointly 
with other cities, towns and counties. This meets the sec-
ond and third requiremenJts set forth by the Supreme 
Court in the Backman case. 
Other comparisons between the Civic Auditorium Act 
and the County Service Area Act show this to be a special 
commission in violation of the Constitution. 
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The Civic Auditorium and Sports Arena Act provides 
the district is authorized to: 
(a) Make, construct and supervise a civic auditorium 
(which is a "municipal improvement") (11-11-2, 11-11-13). 
(b) Control money for and from the operation thereof 
(so the district "supervises money" (11-11-13). 
(c) Levy Taxes (11-11-13). 
The County Service Area Act provides the district is 
authorized to: 
(a) Provide hospital services (which is a "municipal 
improvement") (17-~9-3). 
(b) Control money for and from the operation thereof 
(so the district "supervises money") (17-29-10.2 [ 41] ). 
(c) Levy Taxes (17-29-13, 14). 
In the case of Lehi City vs. Meiling, 48 P. 2d 530, 87 
Utah 237, the question of a "special commission" was 
raised. The majority opinion (p. 535) gave no reason but 
merely said the district was not a special commission. 
Speaking of the Lehi case the court said in the Back-
man case (p. 419): 
"Here is a distinction between this case and 
the Metropolitan Water District Act, as interpreted 
in Lehi vs. M eiling . . . With somewhat tortous 
reasoning, punctuated by two dissents and a special 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
concurring opinion, that case obviously was predi-
cated on the assumption that because of a magni-
tude of water projects which could not have been 
accomplished by a single municipality coupled with 
statewide concern and interest in water consump-
tion and conservation, together with the fact that 
that act was not only general and uniform, calling 
for such promotion not coterminous with any city 
or county, but available for many cities and coun-
ties, overlapping or non-contiguous, there was no 
special commission performing a municipal func-
tion." 
POINT II 
THE 12 PER CENT DEBT LIMITATION WOULD 
VIOLATE ARTICLE XIV, SECTIONS 3 and 4 OF THE 
STATE CONSTITUTION. 
Said Sections provide, in part, as follows: 
"Section 3. No debt in excess of the taxes for the 
current year shall be created by any county or sub-
division thereof, or by a school district therein, or 
by any city, town or village, or any subdivision 
thereof in this state; unless the proposition to cre-
ate such debt, shall have been submitted to a vote 
of such qualified electors as shall have paid a pro-
perty tax therein, in the year preceding such elec-
tion, and a majority of those voting thereon shall 
have voted in favor of incurring such debt." 
"Sec. 4. When authorized to create indebted-
ness as provided in Section 3 of this Article, no 
county shall become indebted to an amount, includ-
ing existing indebtedness exceeding two per cen-
tum. No city, town, school district or other muni-
cipal corporation, shall become indebted to an 
amount, including existing indebtedness, exceeding 
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four per centum of the value of taxable property 
therein ... " 
The act provides for a limitation on the district debt 
of 12 per cent (17-29-21). 
District area is part of a county area (17-29-5). If the 
Legislature by the mere subterfuge of saying that the 
county constitutes a district, or a part of the county con-
stitutes a district, can avoid the 2 per cent limitation of 
indebtedness upon counties, then the above sections are 
emasculated. The Legislature could then declare that the 
county or parts thereof constituted any number of districts 
and thereby create enough taxing units that the result 
could be any amount of indebtedness even up to 100 per 
cent. If these constiutitonal sections are giveDJ effect, the 
total of authorized indebtedness of the county and any 
district therein should not exceed 2 per cent of that of a 
town or city of the third class should not exceed 4 per cent. 
The majority opinion in the Lehi case (supra) (p. 541) 
solved this problem by the simple expedient of declaring 
that a district was a "quasi municipal" body. The decision 
then reasoned that it has some attributes of a municipal 
corporation but does not have to comply with the limita-
tions placed by the constitution on such corporations. The 
concurring opinion of Judge Wolfe (p. 549) concludes that 
the function of the district is proprietary, not governmen-
tal. He somehow concludes therefrom that this takes the 
district out of the classification of a "municipal corpora-
tion. "The dissent (p. 553) logically argues that: 
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"The Constitution of Utah provides for the or-
ganization, management, an'd operation of two class-
es of corporations, viz., municipal corporations, and 
private corporations. For the Legislature or the 
courts by supplying a different adjective modifier 
to the word 'corporation,' and thereby bring about 
a new hybrid entity that is neither municipal nor 
private within the purview of the terms of the Utah 
Constitution, appeals as a refinement. It is an easy 
method to avoid the plain terms of the State Con-
stitution. If constitutional limitations may thus by 
a process of definition be eliminated, evaded, or 
evaporated out of the Constitution, the stabilizing 
purposes and restraints of Constitutions intended 
to tide the people over periods of emergency, excite-
ment, or trouble until calm reflection may analyze 
and measure the needs, will cease to accomplish the 
purposes for which they are intended." 
The memorandum decision by the Honorable C. Nel-
son Day, District Judge, says that this is controlled by the 
cases of Tygeson vs. Magna Water Company, 226 P 2d. 127; 
Lehi City vs. Meiling, 48 P 2d. 530, 87 Utah 237; and Pat-
terick vs. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 106 Utah 
55, 145 P 2d. 503. All three of these cases can be distin-
guished from the present case in that each of them con-
cerned water which has been given special treatment by 
the courts. In the Backman case this court held in a ma-
jority opinion "that case was obviously predicated on the 
assumption that because of the magnitude of the water 
project which could not have been accomplished by a 
single municipality, coupled with statewide concern and 
interest in water consumption and conservation," was the 
reason the court decided that case. 
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In the matter now before the court a single munici-
pality, Beaver, County, can and in reality is building two 
hospitals. The two service areas combined include all of 
Beaver County and nothing else. No good reason has been 
advanced why Beaver County can not and should not build 
hospitals rather than dividing into service areas. It was 
to prevent this very thing that the constitutional limita-
tions were placed upon the legislature. 
POINT III 
IF· THE DISTRICT IS NOT A "SPECIAL COMMIS-
SION" THEN IT MUST BE A MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TION, OTHERWISE ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 5 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION IS VIOLATED. 
Article 13, Section 5, provides: 
"The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the 
purpose of any county, city, town or other munici-
pal corporation, but, may, by law, vest in the cor-
porate authorities thereof, respectively, the power 
to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such 
corporation." 
This section allows the powers of taxation to be exer-
cised only by certain bodies; The only classification, under 
which the water district could fall is the classification of 
municipal corporation. In order to exercise the powers of 
taxation it must be a municipal corporation. If it is a mu-
nicipal corporation, then the debt limitation of a municipal 
corporation set out under Article 14, Sections 3 and 4 dis-
cussed in Point II would be violated. 
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Furthermore, the levying of taxes for county purposes 
i~ limited by this constitutional provision to the corporate 
authorities of the county as pointed out in State v. Stand-
j(fl"d, 24 Utah 148, 66 Pac. 1061, wherein the c_ourt said: 
"Under the Constitution of the State of Utah 
the state has no power to make a disposition of 
county funds, and require that they be appropriated 
for other and different purposes than those for 
which by authority of the county they were col-
lected. San Louis Obispo Co. v. Graves, 84 Cal. 71, 
23 Pac. 1032. In our opinion Section 5, Article 13, of 
the Constitution not only limits local or county tax-
ation to local county purposes, but it was also in-
tended as a limitation upon the power of the legis-
lature to grant the right or impose the duty of cre-
ating a debt or levying a tax to any person or body 
other than the corporate authorities of the county." 
The building and operation of hospitals is a municipal 
function which Beaver County could undertake without 
the creation of separate districts to accomplish the same 
purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
This is an attempt by a single municipality, Beaver 
County, to divide itself and then perform functions as two 
units which it would just as well perform as a single unit. 
By so dividing the county, the county and cities with-
in it are attempting to place themselves in a position to 
by pass the debt limitations placed upon them by the 
Constitution. 
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Neither the respondents in their presentation to the 
District Court nor the Honorable C. Nelson Day in his 
memorandum decision have answered the question as to 
why the County canlnot build hospitals rather than divide 
the County into Service Areas and then tax the same 
people for the same services. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. HAROLD CALL 
Bank Building 
Heber City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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